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“The standard appellate process is slow. For a child in foster care, a
lengthy appellate process can often mean months or years in limbo, without
hope of achieving permanence, to the obvious detriment of the child
1
involved.”
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to propose an expedited
appellate process for child protection appeals in Minnesota in
those cases where parental rights have been terminated at the
district court. An expedited process would allow children to
achieve permanency within the timelines established by federal law
and by standards set by two important professional groups, the
American Bar Association (ABA) and the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ). Importantly, the
proposed process would not disturb the timelines in current
2
juvenile protection proceedings at the district court, thereby
ensuring that termination decisions continue to be thoughtfully
made by district court judges. The proposed process does not
require statutory changes but would require appellate rule changes
and minor administrative adjustments.
In the past four years, 2134 Minnesota children have come
under state guardianship as a result of court terminations of
3
parental rights (TPR). Upon the latest removal from home, a
1. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, ADOPTION AND
PERMANENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
CASES 38 (2000) [hereinafter NCJFCJ], available at http://www.isc.idaho.gov/cp
/docs/Adoption%20and%20Permanecy%20Guidelines.pdf.
2. A juvenile protection proceeding is also known as a “CHIPS” proceeding
and is codified in MINN. STAT. § 260C (2012) (Juvenile Court Act). “CHIPS” stands
for child in need of protection or services. For a basic overview of the CHIPS
procedure, see Self Help Center: Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS), MINN.
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/selfhelp/?page=3234 (last visited Mar. 12,
2014).
3. This statistic was compiled from the four most recent Child Welfare
Reports by the Minnesota Department of Human Services. Each report states the
number of children that became state wards as a result of TPRs in the previous
year. See MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNESOTA’S CHILD WELFARE REPORT 2012,
at 5 (2013) [hereinafter DHS 2012 REPORT], available at https://edocs.dhs.state.mn
.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-5408E-ENG (503 children); MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN
SERVS., MINNESOTA’S CHILD WELFARE REPORT 2011, at 3 (2012), available at https://
edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-5408D-ENG (476 children); MINN.
DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNESOTA’S CHILD WELFARE REPORT 2010, at 5 (2011),
available at https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/lfserver/Public/DHS-5408C-ENG (500
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Minnesota child will spend an average of 745 days in foster care
4
before she is discharged to adoption. Long periods of time in
5
foster care contravene federal mandates and have detrimental
6
effects on a child’s development. A recent study from Chapin Hall,
a policy research center at the University of Chicago, followed 732
7
long-term foster care children from the Midwest. The study
interviewed the participants at ages nineteen, twenty-one, twenty8
three or twenty-four, and twenty-six. The results were not
encouraging. By age twenty-four less than half were employed and
9
only six percent had two- or four-year degrees. Nearly sixty percent
of the males had been convicted of a crime and almost a quarter of
10
them were homeless at some point after leaving foster care.
In addition to the adverse socioeconomic effects of prolonged
11
foster care on children, studies now show that prolonged foster
12
care can permanently damage a child’s brain function. The
children); MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., MINNESOTA’S CHILD WELFARE REPORT
2009, at 5 (2010), available at https://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us /lfserver/Public/DHS
-5408B-ENG (652 children).
4. See DHS 2012 REPORT, supra note 3, § IV, at 19 (stating that in 2012, the
median length of stay in foster care was 24.5 months).
5. JUVENILE PROT. RULES COMM. TO MINN. SUPREME COURT, REPORT AND
PROPOSED RULES AMENDMENTS 6–7 (2009) [hereinafter RULES COMMITTEE REPORT],
available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Clerks_Office/Order
_Juv_Protection_Proposed_Amendments.pdf (detailing how Minnesota is falling
behind the federal Child and Family Services Review mandating that adoptions be
finalized within twenty-four months of removal).
6. See Jessica K. Heldman, Comment, Court Delay and the Waiting Child,
40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1001, 1010–12 (2003) (discussing why lengthy court
proceedings have such a profound negative impact on young children).
7. MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH (2011), available at http://www.chapinhall
.org/research/report/midwest-evaluation-adult-functioning-former-foster-youth.
8. Id.
9. MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGES 23 AND 24, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 9 (2010), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files
/Midwest_Study_ES_Age_23_24.pdf.
10. Id. at 4; see also Pam Fessler, Report: Foster Kids Face Tough Times After
Age 18, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 7, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates
/story/story.php?storyId=125594259.
11. See COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 7; Heldman, supra note 6, at 1010–12.
12. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, The Science of Neglect:
The Persistent Absence of Responsive Care Disrupts the Developing Brain 1 (Harvard
Univ. Ctr. on the Developing Child, Working Paper No. 12, 2012) [hereinafter
Working Paper 12], available at http://developingchild.harvard.edu/index.php
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absence of a responsive relationship (normal parent-child
relationship) activates the body’s stress response systems and
13
triggers the release of cortisol. Frequent activation of cortisol can
14
alter the function of a child’s brain :

15

Figure 1

?cID=476 (“Because responsive relationships are developmentally expected and
biologically essential, their absence signals a serious threat to child well-being,
particularly during the earliest years, and this absence activates the body’s stress
response systems.”).
13. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, Excessive Stress Disrupts
the Architecture of the Developing Brain 3 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. on the Developing
Child, Working Paper No. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Working Paper 3], available at
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/index.php/resources/reports_and_working
_papers/working_papers/wp3.
14. Id. at 2–3 (“[L]ong-term elevations in cortisol levels can alter the
function of a number of neural systems, and even change the architecture of
regions in the brain that are essential for learning and memory.”).
15. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, The Impact of
Early Adversity on Children’s Development, CENTER ON DEVELOPING CHILD,
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/index.php/resources/briefs/inbrief_series
/inbrief_the_impact_of_early_adversity (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (citing Peter J.
Marshall et al., A Comparison of the Electroencephalogram Between Institutionalized and
Community Children in Romania, 16 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1327, 1333 (2004)).
This image depicts the activity of children’s brains through electrical impulses. It
compares the brain activity of a child who has been institutionalized with the brain
activity of a child who has never been institutionalized. “Young children
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Undergoing repeated stress response can cause “stress-related
disorders affecting both mental (e.g., depression, anxiety disorders,
alcoholism, drug abuse) and physical (e.g., cardiovascular disease,
16
diabetes, stroke) health.” Furthermore, the longer the length of
stay in foster care, the more likely it is that the child experiences
multiple placement settings—effectively ensuring that no
responsive relationships will be formed and, instead, only
17
increasing the child’s stress responses. Indeed, the biological
effects of being deprived of a responsive relationship are so
detrimental that it has prompted one author to claim that
“deprivation or neglect can cause more harm to a young child’s
18
development than overt physical abuse.”

19

Figure 2

institutionalized in poor conditions show much less than the expected activity.” Id.
16. Working Paper 3, supra note 13, at 2.
17. DHS 2012 REPORT, supra note 3, § II, at 16 (“[A]s children were in care
longer, the likelihood that they experienced multiple placement settings
increased. For children who were in care for 12 or fewer months, the vast majority
lived in only one or two different homes or facilities (87 percent). Children in care
for two years or more were more likely to move multiple times.”).
18. Working Paper 12, supra note 12, at 2.
19. Nat’l Scientific Council on the Developing Child, supra note 15
(demonstrating a correlation between stress-inducing adverse childhood

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2

2014] MINNESOTA’S CHILD PROTECTION APPEALS PROCESS

895

As the latest research demonstrates, reducing the amount of
time to permanency is an urgent consideration for government
officials charged with the care and well-being of Minnesota
20
children involuntarily removed from their family homes. The
courts should adopt procedures, informed by the most recent child
welfare research, that seek to reduce as much as possible the
amount of time spent in foster care. One strategy for reducing the
amount of time that children spend in foster care is to consider
reducing the long time period for the appeal of child protection
cases.
I.

FEDERAL PERMANENCY TIMELINES

The 1980 version of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(“Act”) was updated by Congress in 1997 by the addition of fixed
21
timelines for permanency proceedings. The Act required states to
initiate court proceedings to free a child for adoption once the
child had been waiting in foster care for fifteen of the previous
22
twenty-two months, with some exceptions.
The federal timeline in cases where reunification efforts are
underway requires a permanency hearing at twelve months from
the child being placed out of the home, the filing of a TPR petition
23
by fifteen months, and a termination hearing as soon as possible.
In cases where a judicial officer determines that reasonable efforts
of reunification will not be made, the permanency hearing is to
occur within thirty days and the TPR petition should be filed as
soon as possible, especially when adoption is the goal for the
24
child.

experiences and the risk of heart disease later in life).
20. Meeting federal timelines is also an important source of federal funding.
For example, see 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2006 & Supp. 2011) for a discussion of
“adoption incentive payments.”
21. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111
Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). To clarify, all
references to “the Act” are to the 1997 version of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act, rather than the original 1980 version.
22. See James R. Marsh, Federal Impact on Adoptions, in 2 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 17.02[2] (Matthew Bender 2013).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C), (E).
24. Id. § 671(a)(15)(E)(i)–(ii).
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The purpose of the timelines in the Act is rational and clearly
25
articulated: reduce the time that children spend in foster care.
This purpose is reinforced by the regulations adopted by the
Children’s Bureau, the agency that conducts Federal Child and
Family Services Reviews (CFSR), which mandates adoptions to be
finalized within twenty-four months (730 days) of the child’s removal
26
from home.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE COMPLIANCE (THE REALITY)
To date, the Act has helped the cause of child welfare by
significantly reducing the number of children in Minnesota who
languish in foster care without hope of finding a permanent home.
This was accomplished by changes that were made to key
27
procedural requirements at the trial court level. In addition, state
agencies are encouraged to move quickly by being provided
incentive payments for successful adoptions and technical
28
assistance in the adoption process. Again, it is important to
remember that the Act changes applied primarily at the trial level.
Minnesota is largely in compliance with the federal timelines
for the trial court process. Briefly, a juvenile protection proceeding,
also known as a CHIPS proceeding, is a collaborative process
between a number of stakeholders, including the court, parents,
lawyers, social workers, and guardians ad litem. At the district court
level, the goal is to aggressively work with parents and create a plan
29
for reunification. After the parents attend an admit/deny hearing,
a case plan is worked up detailing the responsibilities of each

25. See id. § 671(a)(15)(C); Susan C. Wawrose, “Can We Go Home Now?”:
Expediting Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights Appeals in Ohio State Courts, 4 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 257, 260 (2002) (“Congress enacted [the Act] in order to
reduce the number of children in foster care by doubling the number of
adoptions, measured annually, by 2002.”).
26. RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6–7 (detailing how Minnesota
is falling behind the Federal Child and Family Services Review mandating that
adoptions be finalized within twenty-four months of removal).
27. Wawrose, supra note 25, at 260.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1) (providing that states receive $4000 for each
foster child adopted beyond a base number of foster-child adoptions established
for that state); see also Marsh, supra note 22, at § 17.05[1] (discussing state adoptive
incentive payments).
29. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.001, subdiv. 2(b)(7)(i) (2012).
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30

party. The case plan acts as a roadmap to the child’s timely and
safe return home with the main components being:
(1) identification of safety risks to the child (e.g., the underlying
issues that caused the CHIPS case to be filed for this child);
(2) tasks related to the safety issues that the parents must complete
(e.g., parent education, anger management, psychological
evaluation, etc.);
(3) behavioral changes the parents must demonstrate and sustain
(e.g., appropriate discipline methods, safety plans if the
parents know they are going to relapse, etc.); and
(4) the efforts the agency must make to help the parents meet the
goals of the case plan (e.g., arranging for visitation, arranging
31
for transportation, etc.).
To comply with the federal standard, a review hearing is held after
six months in order to evaluate the parents’ progress on the case
32
plan. At that hearing the judge can direct the county to file a
permanency petition if the parents are not complying with the case
plan, or the judge can reward the parents’ efforts with a six-month
continuance during which the parents return to court every ninety
33
days. Again, the process at this point is designed to be much more
collaborative than punitive. The county is required to file a
permanency petition after eleven months and the length of the
34
entire CHIPS proceeding is capped at 365 days.
The authors recommend that the rules for Minnesota’s CHIPS
proceedings remain unchanged. The proceedings provide an
opportunity for parents to make behavioral changes in the home
and regain custody of the child. The burden is appropriately placed
on the county to expend reasonable efforts at family reunification.
Importantly, the CHIPS proceeding is a collaborative process
aimed at working with parents in order to find the best solution for
the child. If a parent is able to demonstrate that real change has
30. See id. § 260C.212; see also Judith Nord, Permanency Timeline for
Children in Out-of-Home Placement, MINN. JUD. BRANCH (Aug. 2013), http://
www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Childrens_Justice_Initiative/Nord__Permanency_Timeline_for_Children_in_Out_of_Home_Placement_(Nord).pdf.
31. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.212.
32. Id. § 260C.204(a). Under the Act, federal law requires a review hearing to
be held within twelve months from the date of removal. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(c).
Minnesota’s six-month requirement ensures that this standard is met.
33. See MINN. STAT. § 260C.204(c).
34. Id. § 260C.505(a).
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taken place, then the court should not hesitate in awarding
reunification. The current process provides parents a fair
opportunity to make such a demonstration.
Further shortening the CHIPS timeline may place an unfair
burden on parents to accomplish their case plan. The current
timeline allows parents six months to show the court they are
making progress on their case plan. At that point, the judge can
either direct the county to file a permanency petition or extend the
case for another six months and give parents further opportunity to
make progress on the case plan. This flexibility is crucial to ensure
that the CHIPS proceeding remains a collaborative process. In the
interest of preserving that flexibility, it is the authors’ opinion that
the timelines of the CHIPS proceeding should remain untouched.
Reducing the length of time to permanency must be accomplished
in other ways.
III. APPEALS CONTRIBUTE TO DELAY IN LENGTH OF TIME TO
PERMANENCY
In the interest of reducing the length of time to permanency,
the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile Protection Rules
35
Committee recommended appellate rule changes in 2008. The
2008 amendments reduced the decision-making time for TPR cases
in both the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota
36
Supreme Court. The maximum time from conclusion of a TPR
trial to issuance of a court of appeals decision was reduced from
337 to 255 days, while the maximum time from TPR trial to a
37
Minnesota Supreme Court decision went from 522 to 425 days.
Despite the 2008 rule changes, Minnesota still lags behind the
38
nationally recommended best practices. One obvious reason is
Minnesota’s lengthy appellate process.
The American Bar Association (ABA) and National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges (NCJFCJ) have set forth appellate
standards that balance the state’s interests in timely permanency
for children with the parents’ interests in the care and custody of

35. See generally RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5 (recommending
changes at both the trial court and appellate court level).
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id.
38. Id. app. B at 105 (illustrating the NCJFCJ standard as 215 days, the ABA
standard as 240 days, and the amended Minnesota standard as 290 days).
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their children. The ABA recommends that the total appellate
process take a maximum of 240 days, while the NCJFCJ
39
recommends the process take a maximum of 215 days. Bear in
mind that these are recommendations for the time it takes from a
conclusion of a TPR trial to issuance of the final appellate decision.
While these best practices timelines set aside 215–240 days for the
entire appellate procedure, Minnesota’s current appellate timeline
sets aside 255 days just for the intermediate appellate decision with
40
the final appellate decision being made within 425 days.
In 2007, the Children’s Bureau of the Federal Administration
for Children and Families conducted a CFSR in Minnesota.
Following a review of Minnesota juvenile protection cases from
April 2006 to September 2007, a final report was issued detailing
41
areas of “strength” and “areas needing improvement.” The
timeliness of Minnesota’s adoptions was specifically identified as an
42
“area needing improvement.” The report stated:
[D]iligent efforts were made [by DHS] to achieve
adoptions in a timely manner in 43 percent of the cases.
This percentage is less than the 90 percent or higher
required for a rating of Strength. In the State’s 2001
CFSR, this item was also rated as an [area needing
43
improvement].
The report further cites the appellate process as a contributing
factor in Minnesota’s delay:
[A]lthough the State has a process in place for filing
termination of parental rights (TPR) for children who
have been in foster care, in both the Statewide Assessment
and the on-site review, concerns were identified with
timely filing or achievement of TPR. These delays were
attributed for the most part to court practices, such as
delays in scheduling, continuances, appeals, and problems
44
with establishing paternity.
As a result of the CFSR, Minnesota’s Department of Human
Services was required to develop a Program Improvement Plan to
39. Id.
40. Id. at 8.
41. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FINAL REPORT: MINNESOTA CHILD
AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW 32 (2008).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, app. D at 111; see U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 41, at 5.
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address the areas of concern. Failure to timely achieve the targets
in the Improvement Plan could result in a financial penalty to the
45
state of up to $9.2 million.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Under the current Minnesota practice, a final appellate
decision is not completed until 425 days after the conclusion of the
trial, twice as long as the timeline recommendation of the ABA of
210 days. The most obvious barrier to a much more timely
appellate process is the existing two-level appeal system. The
authors suggest that Minnesota come into conformity with the
appellate timeline recommendations of the ABA and implement
procedural and administrative changes by adopting a one-step
appeal process. Under this proposal, a final appellate decision
could be achieved within 210 days of the conclusion of the TPR
trial.
In those cases where the district court has terminated parental
rights, the Minnesota Supreme Court could grant immediate
review on appeal and decide the appeal within 210 days. The court
has statutory authority to grant accelerated review of any case
pending before the court of appeals, so long as the case is of “such
imperative public importance as to justify the deviation from
normal appellate processes and to require immediate settlement in
46
the supreme court.” The livelihood of the removed children in
these situations should certainly be of “imperative public
importance,” as the damaging effects of prolonged out-of-home
47
care have been well documented. Importantly, the statutory
mandate requires more timely appellate decision-making than
Minnesota now delivers. Unlike the district court proceedings
where the existing timelines are appropriate to allow the case plans
to be developed and implemented, and to develop new facts, an
appellate process is designed to simply review the correctness of the
district court’s termination order.
In those cases where the supreme court is satisfied that the
court of appeals is in the best position to decide the issues, the
supreme court could allow the court of appeals to render a final
decision. This change would not require significant rule or
45.
46.
47.

RULES COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, app. D at 110 .
MINN. STAT. § 480A.10, subdiv. 2 (2012).
See Heldman, supra note 6, at 1010–11.
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statutory changes as it is within the supreme court’s existing
authority to take direct review of any case on appeal. While a onestep appellate process would require a change in appellate
procedures, it would be well within the supreme court’s existing
authority under Minnesota Statutes section 480A.10 and would
have the welcome effect of cutting by half the length of the final
decision on appeal.
Minnesota would potentially be a frontrunner in
48
implementing a one-step appellate process, but a number of
jurisdictions have already moved toward a more expedited
49
appellate procedure in TPR cases. Recognizing the need for
quicker resolution, Iowa implemented rule changes in 2002 for
50
expediting TPR appeals. The main procedural change required
counsel to submit fill-in-the-blank petitions aimed at raising issues,
51
as opposed to lengthy briefs aimed at arguing issues. Ultimately,
Iowa’s expedited appellate procedure reduced the time from
juvenile court dispositional order to finalized appeal to about
52
ninety days. While the 2002 amendments incorporated a number
53
of specific changes, Iowa’s time standards were specifically
54
designed to mirror the NCJFCJ best practices timelines. Iowa’s
solution may differ from the one-step procedure proposed in this
article; however, their judicial system should be commended for
55
recognizing the pressing need for change and taking action to fix
56
the problem.
48. Excluding those state jurisdictions without an intermediate appellate
court.
49. For a national overview of jurisdictions with expedited appellate
procedures, see Appellate Procedure: State Links, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. (NCSC),
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/appellate/appellate-procedure/state-links.aspx.
See also Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Expediting the Adoption Process at the Appellate
Level, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 121 app. (1999).
50. Gayle Nelson Vogel, Expediting Dependency Appeals, 26 CHILD L. PRAC. 139,
140 (2007). On July 1, 2003, Iowa expanded these rule changes to include all
juvenile court dependency cases. Id.
51. Id. at 139.
52. Id.
53. See id. for a step-by-step layout of how Iowa’s expedited system works.
54. Id. at 139 n.1; see also NCJFCJ, supra note 1, at 40 (outlining the NCJFCJ’s
proposed appellate timelines).
55. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Iowa 1987) (stating that delaying
resolution of termination cases is “decidedly antagonistic to the children’s best
interests”).
56. Vogel, supra note 49, at 141.
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Adopting a system similar to the one-step solution proposed
here, Idaho allows parties to petition the Idaho Supreme Court to
57
accept a permissive appeal following a TPR. While the Idaho
Supreme Court will not accept an appeal unless “the best interest
58
of a child would be served,” Idaho’s permissive appeals procedure
at the very least provides an avenue for quick resolution of TPR
59
appeals. Although its system may not be perfect, Idaho’s
permissive appeals provision is exemplary of a growing recognition
60
of the need to quicken the appellate procedure in TPR cases.
As shown above, the need for expedited appeals in TPR cases
has been established by the statutes and by best practices standards.
But states have been slow to act. Implementing a one-step appellate
process would put Minnesota at the forefront in effecting change.
It would provide other jurisdictions with a novel solution to a wellrecognized problem.

The expedited appellate procedure has served Iowa’s children and
families well. In a climate of increasing juvenile caseloads and limited
resources, the expedited process also has many side benefits. It allows
juvenile court judges to close case files sooner, eliminating interim
review hearings. It reduces social workers’ courtroom time, eases their
reporting and allows them to also close their case files much sooner. It
saves attorney time, and often witness time, in preparing for and
participating in additional hearings. However, the primary benefit of
the expedited appellate process is what the task force set out to
accomplish—more timely permanency for children and families.
Id.
57. IDAHO APP. R. 12.1; see, e.g., Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 209
P.3d 654, 655 (Idaho 2009); see also IDAHO APP. R. 12.2 (providing for expedited
review).
58. See IDAHO APP. R. 12.1.
59. For example, extensive delays may still occur if neither party decides to
pursue a permissive appeal. See, e.g., Elizabeth Brandt, Cautionary Tales of Adoption:
Addressing the Litigation Crisis at the Moment of Adoption, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 187, 195 n.53 (2005) (discussing Roe Family Servs. v. Doe, 88 P.3d 749
(Idaho 2004), in which neither party appeared to take advantage of the permissive
appeal provision and the final decision was pending for nineteen months).
60. Id. (“Many states adopted provisions such as Idaho’s as a partial response
to the delay documented in cases such as the Baby Jessica case.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 2

2014] MINNESOTA’S CHILD PROTECTION APPEALS PROCESS

903

V. OBSTACLES TO A ONE-STEP APPELLATE PROCESS?
A.

Due Process
61

In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that state intervention to terminate parental rights “must be
accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due
62
Process Clause.” Further, the extent of due process that must be
afforded the recipient is “influenced by the extent to which he may
63
be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss.’” The termination of
parental rights is no doubt a grievous loss to parents, in that it
legally ends their relationship with a child or children. Thus, the
implementation of a truly expedited appeals process must satisfy
64
due process. In child protection matters, the best interests of the
child are paramount, and as such are a compelling governmental
interest. When it is determined that parents are unfit to be party to
a parent-child relationship, the TPR is necessary to protect the best
interests of the child. Similarly, an expedited process is in the best
interests of the child in that it provides permanency sooner.
While it is clear that trial court proceedings necessitate a due
process analysis, the institution of an expedited appeals process
also raises questions of due process. In short, would
implementation of an expedited appeals timeline threaten due
process? The short answer is no; it would not. “An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
61. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
62. Id. at 753 (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 37 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 758 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970)).
64. A due process analysis begins with a determination of whether or not the
right at issue is a fundamental right. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000),
the United States Supreme Court recognized “the fundamental right of parents to
rear their children.” See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 745; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 164 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1928); Pierce v. Soc’y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). The second step of the analysis asks
whether the government has infringed that right. It is clear that where the
government has terminated parental rights, it has directly and substantially
interfered with that parent’s rights. Because the right to parent is fundamental,
the infringement receives strict scrutiny and in order to pass constitutional muster,
there must be a compelling governmental purpose in enacting the law.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Finally, the means chosen
must be necessary to achieve the government’s compelling purpose. Id. at 721.
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65

appropriate to the nature of the case.’” As a matter of practicality,
parents being deprived of their parental rights have already
received notice and a hearing on the matter. As party to that trial
court proceeding, all parties can anticipate an appeal. Timely filing
and proper service of an appeal, in no matter how short a time,
necessarily satisfies due process, for “[t]he essential requirements
of due process, and all that respondents seek . . . are notice and an
66
opportunity to respond.”
Compliance with due process in expedited appeals is also
assured by the appointment of counsel for the parents. While TPR
matters are not criminal matters governed by the Sixth
Amendment’s right to the assistance of counsel, the Supreme
Court has stated “the appointment of counsel for indigent parents
in termination proceedings [is] to be answered in the first instance
67
by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.” Further,
the Lassiter Court argued that appointment would be due when
68
warranted by the type, character, and difficulty of the case.
Recognizing the challenge of an appeal to a TPR proceeding,
wherein a parent’s rights may be reinstated or the termination
affirmed, due process necessitates the appointment of counsel for
indigent parents.
B.

Equal Protection

Shortening the appeals process may lead to challenges based
on the Equal Protection Clause. Such a challenge would argue that
the expedited system subjects a parent to a shortened appellate
system, while the appellants of other criminal and civil cases do not
face the same accelerated procedure. Ultimately, as was the case
with potential due process concerns, these challenges are
unfounded.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, having implemented a procedure
69
similar to the one proposed here, has already upheld the
65. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
66. Id. at 546. The State’s attorney could, and arguably should, make note of
the expedited appeals process that may be commenced following a termination
finding on the record during the termination proceeding.
67. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32 (1981).
68. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 (1996) (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 31–32).
69. See IOWA R. APP. P. 201–205.
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constitutionality of an expedited appellate procedure in the face of
70
an Equal Protection Clause challenge. The plaintiff in In re C.M.
was a mother who argued that an equal protection violation existed
because “permit[ting] the victim of a broken contract to fully
participate in an appeal . . . while prohibiting a mother seeking to
preserve her right to be a part of her child’s life from doing the
same is not a logical nor legitimate distinction and serves no
71
legitimate state purpose.” While the court discussed what standard
of scrutiny would apply, it ultimately determined that the point was
moot because the appellate procedure would survive even if the
72
more stringent strict scrutiny standard was required.
Accelerating the appeals of TPR cases is a narrowly tailored
process that serves a compelling governmental interest. The state’s
interest in ensuring proper care and treatment for children
subjected to a termination proceeding is certainly a compelling
interest. The very motivation behind the Act was aimed at
emphasizing the need for obtaining a home for a child as soon as
73
possible. Courts have recognized that lengthy delays of termination cases are “decidedly antagonistic to the children’s best
74
interests.”
Additionally, a one-step appeals process would be narrowly
tailored to the state’s compelling interest. The speedy resolution of
75
appeals impacts the state’s ability to achieve permanency quickly
while not compromising the reviewing court’s ability to evaluate
76
whether termination is appropriate. While eliminating the
intermediate stage certainly accelerates the appellate process, the

70. See In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 212 (Iowa 2002).
71. Id. at 209–10.
72. Id. at 210 (citations omitted).
[A] rational basis standard would govern. That is because the right to
appeal is not a fundamental right, nor even a constitutional right. . . .
[O]ne could argue that the classification impacts a parent’s
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her
child. . . . We find it unnecessary to decide which level of scrutiny
applies, because even if the more stringent test is required, that test is
met.
Id.
73. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2006).
74. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Iowa 1987).
75. See supra Part III.
76. Under our proposed “one-step” process, this reviewing court would be
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
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appellant still receives a full and fair review from the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Receiving an appeal at an intermediate stage
should not be a prerequisite to satisfying the equal protection
77
clause.
CONCLUSION
Minnesota’s current appellate process is simply too slow in
dealing with TPR cases. A TPR appeal under the current procedure
may take up to 425 days before a final decision is reached. If the
district court proceedings take a full year to achieve a permanency
order, then a child is facing a period of 790 days of foster care.
While the CHIPS timeline should remain untouched, significant
progress in reducing days in foster care could be made by adopting
a one-step appellate procedure. By doing so, Minnesota could
bring the current 425-day procedure closer to the 215- to 240-day
best practices timeline recommended by the NCJFCJ and the ABA.
The groundwork for such a strategy has already been laid by a
number of other states and Minnesota now has an opportunity to
be a national leader in reforms to reduce the time for an appeal.
Children suffering the long-term effects of foster care need us to
take this action now.

77. Holding otherwise would certainly have a profound impact on states that
do not have an intermediate appellate stage.
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